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Abstract
This paper analyzes what happens to the Spence signaling model
when there is heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and char-
acter. Competency is productivity at work. Character is the taste for
study. If heterogeneity in character is low, the equilibrium is separat-
ing. If heterogeneity in character is high, the equilibrium is partially
pooling. In the partially pooling equilibrium, only extreme types can
be distinguished. Expected competency is monotonically increasing in
the level of education. Supplementary information can reveal personal
characteristics, acting as a sign of work productivity.
Key words: asymmetric information, adverse selection, indices,
signals, signs
JEL: J31, D10
1 Introduction
In Spence (1973), though education does not increase productivity, it acts as
a signal of productivity because more productive individuals have lower costs
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of education. Signals as a way to solve problems of asymmetric information
were pointed out in Akerlof (1970), e.g. the use of guarantees by sellers of
high-quality goods for whom guarantees were less expensive.
However, signals may depend on other factors besides quality. This paper
speci…cally asks what happens when the costs of education also depend on
di¤erences in the taste for study. Once other personal traits are taken into
account, does education still act as a separating signal? That individuals
can di¤er both in competency and in character is already recognized in the
Akerlof (1970) lemons model. The problem with lemons arises not only
because there are di¤erent quality cars, but also because there are dishonest
sellers who are willing to misstate the quality of a used car.
The in‡uence of a person’s character on the costs of education leads to
asymmetric information in an additional dimension. The reason for asym-
metric information is quite simple. Di¤erences in the taste for study are part
of personal preferences, so this is private information. These preferences have
to be inferred from actions, just like competence at work.
This paper shows that with two-dimensional asymmetric information, if
heterogeneity in character is low a separating equilibrium still exists. If
heterogeneity in character is high, no separating equilibrium exists. Instead,
there is a partially pooling equilibrium. In the partially pooling equilibrium,
the probability the worker is competent is monotonically increasing in the
signal. Signaling is still informative, but only extreme types can be told
apart.
An implication of the result that education may not lead to a separating
equilibrium is that other types of information will be used by employers
to sort out the productivity of workers. To formalize this, we embed the
education signaling game in a two-period model.
A two-period framework is a simple way to separate the early and the later
job career. Education may be specially important as a signal on entry to the
job market, and can be used by …rms to sort workers in a rough way. Later
on, …rms can use additional information such as the previous employment
record. Work experience, and the continuity of employment relationships,
may work as a sign of quality for workers already in the job market. The
implication of this information will depend on whether it is private or it
becomes public. If it becomes public, there is a separating equilibrium in
the second period in which wages do not depend on education. If it remains
private to the …rms, …rms will enjoy an informational monopoly and need
not adjust wages to productivity.
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2 Education as a signal
The signaling model is a variant of Spence (1973). The players are workers
and …rms. The timing is that workers …rst decide the level of education, that
is used as a signal in the job market. Competitive …rms then make their
wage o¤ers, based on the expected productivity of the workers.
We …rst describe preferences, and the consequent heterogeneity of types
along the dimensions of productivity and character. Spence (1973) implicitly
assumes that heterogeneity in character is null. Hence, there is only asym-
metric information in one dimension, the degree of productivity. Once there
is heterogeneity in character, there will be asymmetric information in two
dimensions. However, whether this a¤ects the original Spence results will
depend on the degree of heterogeneity.
2.1 Preferences
Let a workers’ utility depend positively on wages and negatively on the cost
of education,
U(w; e; µ; º) = w ¡ c(e; µ; º),(1)
where w stands for wage and e for education level, where e ¸ 0. The utility
cost of education c depends on a worker’s productivity type µ, and on taste
for education º.1
In keeping with the original Spence model, the in‡uence of the parameters
µ and º on the costs of education are given an extremely simple formulation,
c(e; µ; º) =
c(e)
µº
,(2)
where high productivity µ and high taste for education º both lower the
costs of education, and c0(e) > 0 (in the …gures below, we assume c(e) = e2
for concreteness). These assumption imply that the slope of the indi¤erence
curves in space (e; w), UeUw = ¡
c0(e)
µº , are ‡atter for more productive individ-
uals (higher µ). Indi¤erence curves are also ‡atter for individuals fonder of
education (higher º).
1Alternatively, the desire to achieve social recognition, or other factors, could explain
di¤erences in the psychic costs of education.
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Firms are risk-neutral and maximize pro…ts. Pro…ts equal a worker’s
productivity minus wages:
¼ = µ¡ w(3)
In a setting with perfectly competitive markets, expected pro…ts will be
zero, so in expected value wages will equal productivity. The behavior of
competitive …rms that compete à la Bertrand can be represented by a sin-
gle player that minimizes a loss function given by the quadratic di¤erence
between wages and productivity (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, chap. 11).
2.2 Worker heterogeneity
We assume that productivity may be either low or high, µ 2 fµ; µg, and taste
for education may also be low or high, º 2 fº; ºg. Heterogeneity among
individuals implies that there are four types of agents:
<please insert Table 1>
Let heterogeneity in character be denoted by
h ´ v ¡ v(4)
The knife-edge case of heterogeneity eh that separates low and high het-
erogeneity is given by
µ(º + eh) = µv(5)
The interval of low heterogeneity corresponds to h 2 [0;eh), while the
interval of high heterogeneity corresponds to h 2 [eh;H], for some positive
H > eh. In the knife-edge case h = eh, the indi¤erence curves of types (µ; º)
and (º; µ) are exactly superimposed on each other.
If no signal were available, all workers would have a common level of zero
education. In that case, …rms would o¤er workers a wage equal to expected
productivity, i.e. w = E(µ), where E(µ) = p11 + p21)µ + (p12 + p22)µ. Hence,
equilibrium wages will be in interval (µ; µ). We now analyze what happens
when a signal is available to di¤erentiate workers.
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2.3 Low heterogeneity in character
In terms of the present notation, the original Spence model corresponds to
h = 0. This case boils down to two types of workers, high and low produc-
tivity. Spence (1973) shows there are a continuum of separating equilibria.
By the Cho-Kreps intuitive equilibrium, only the least cost separating signal,
where the unproductive worker is just indi¤erent between studying or not,
remains.
There is also a pooling equilibrium in Spence(1973), which can be dis-
carded applying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. A competent worker has
lower signaling costs, so it will be willing to deviate to levels of education
higher than what an incompetent worker would ever pick.
These same results generalize to the case of h 2 (0;eh). The ranking of
marginal costs of education, which determine the slope of the indi¤erence
curves, is inversely related to the product » ´ µº in (2). In the interval with
low heterogeneity, the single-crossing property is satis…ed since the ranking
of marginal costs of education is:
µº < µº < µv < µº(6)
That is to say, in this interval more productive workers have lower costs
of education than less productive workers, so productivity still allows to rank
workers unambiguously.
In a separating equilibrium, beliefs bµ on expected worker productivity will
be given by
(7) e = 0 ) bµ = µ
e = es ) bµ = µ
For out-of-equilibrium values of education e, we assume a …rm will assignbµ = µ if e < es, and bµ = µ if e > es. These beliefs determine the conditional
probability a worker is productive, for each observed level of education.
One can de…ne the signal es uniquely by picking as signal the least-cost
level of education that will di¤erentiate productive and unproductive workers,
as Figure 1 shows.
<please insert Figure 1>
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The least cost separating signal is determined by the unproductive worker
with a high taste for study, at point A in Figure 1. At point A, worker type
(µ; º) is indi¤erent between getting a high wage w = µ with education e = es,
and a low wage w = µ with education e = 0. One can assume it will not
signal when it is just indi¤erent (to break indi¤erence, it would su¢ce to
consider a signal es+², with ² > 0 that is arbitrarily small). Hence, behavior
will conform to (7), so this is indeed a separating equilibrium.
One can discard a pooling equilibrium w = E(µ), where all workers are
paid the average productivity of the pool of workers, by application of the
Cho-Kreps criterion. This is shown in Figure 2.
<Please insert Figure 2>
The farthest that an incompetent worker is willing to deviate is point B,
with education ed. Productive workers have lower signaling costs, so they can
be better o¤ to the right of that point. Since those deviations are dominated
in equilibrium for unproductive types, but not for productive types, …rms can
infer that a worker is productive if levels of education larger than (or equal
to) ed are observed. That restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs destroys
any pooling equilibria.
Likewise, one can also discard partially pooling equilibria where either
the three types with highest » choose the same signal, or where the two
intermediate types of » choose the same intermediate signal. The reason
is that the indi¤erence curves of productive workers are ‡atter than the
indi¤erence curves of unproductive types, so productive workers will always
be willing to deviate farther to the right than unproductive workers.
These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 With low heterogeneity in character, there is a unique sepa-
rating equilibrium. Unproductive workers pick low education and productive
workers pick high education.
Hence, with low heterogeneity in character the signaling results of the
basic Spence model are robust to two-dimensional asymmetric information.
In this interval, only the undominated separating equilibrium survives re…ne-
ments of the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that apply the intuitive criterion.
2.4 High heterogeneity in character
The interval of high heterogeneity corresponds to h 2 [eh;H]. In this interval,
the single-crossing property is no longer satis…ed, since the ranking of types
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2 and 3 is inverted:
µº < µv < µº < µº(8)
We will …rst show that no separating equilibrium exists. Why not is easy
to see from Figure 3.
<please insert Figure 3>
When heterogeneity in character is high, an unproductive worker with
high taste for studying is willing to invest in more education than a productive
worker with low taste for studying. That is, a productive worker of type (µ; À)
is not willing to go farther than point C in Figure 3, while an unproductive
worker of type (µ; º) is.
A pooling equilibrium can be discarded, as in the case of low heterogeneity
in character, by application of the intuitive criterion. A productive worker of
type (µ; º) will always be willing to deviate. A partially pooling equilibrium
where type (µ; º) worker picks zero education, and all other workers pick a
common positive level of education, can be ruled out by similar arguments.
The other logical possibility is a partially pooling equilibrium with the
following features. Type (µ; º) picks zero education. Worker types (µ; º)
and (µ; À) send the same, intermediate,signal. Finally, type (µ; º) picks the
highest level of education. Beliefs bµ are thus given by:
(9) e = 0 ) bµ = µ
e = ei ) bµ = p12µ + p21µ
p12 + p21
e = es ) bµ = µ
For out-of-equilibrium levels of education, we again assume that expected
productivity corresponds to the lowest level of education within that inter-
val. The equilibrium with the least-cost signals is represented graphically in
Figure 4.
<please insert Figure 4 here>
The least-cost intermediate signal is determined at point D, with edu-
cation e = ei and average wage w = wi, that is on the indi¤erence curve
of unproductive worker type (µ; º) that goes through point with coordinates
e = 0 and w = µ. As to the least-cost separating signal, it is determined
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at point E, where education e = es with wage w = µ, which for unproduc-
tive worker of type (µ; º) is just indi¤erent to point D. Given these levels
of expected productivity, …rms will be willing to actually pay these wages.
Note that this partially pooling equilibrium exists for any set of positive
probabilities {p11,p12,p21,p22}.
However, this partially pooling equilibrium is not unique. Any interme-
diate signal in the range between point D in Figure 4 and the point where
the indi¤erence curve of type (µ; º) cuts the intermediate wage line (call it
D’) will also satisfy (9), as long as the separating signal is now determined
at point where the indi¤erence curve of type (µ; º) through point D’ cuts the
high wage line (call this point E’). Just like in the Spence signaling game
with three types of productivity, the intuitive criterion is not strong enough
to rule out all these other partially pooling equilibria that are less e¢cient
than the undominated partially pooling equilibrium depicted in Figure 4.2
Hence,
Proposition 2 With high heterogeneity in character, there exists a partially
pooling equilibrium. Unproductive workers with no taste for study pick low
education. Unproductive workers with taste for study and productive workers
with no taste for study pick an intermediate education. Productive workers
with taste for study pick high education. This equilibrium is not unique.
Besides the undominated equilibrium, similar partially pooling equilibria with
excess education are possible.
Proposition 2 implies that extreme signals are still e¤ective to convey
a workers type. It is in the middle ground that there may be imperfect
revelation of a worker’s type.
2.5 Extension from 2x2 case to NxN case
What happens to the Spence model if we know consider a multiplicity of types
of productivity and of taste for study? Assume that the interval between the
2The only equilibria that can be ruled out over the D,D’ interval are those where the
highest possible wage for type (µ; º), i.e. w = µ, is at an education level that leads to a
point below the indi¤erence currve that gives this type its equilibrium payo¤. In that case,
equilibrium dominance arguments can be used to rule out this type, so expected compe-
tency will be above µ. However, unless indi¤erence curves of type (µ; º ) are vertical, there
always remains a non-empty interval to the right of D over which equilibrium dominance
arguments have no bite.
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lowest and highest type in each dimension there are anotherN¡2 types that
are evenly spaced apart. Since many possible combinations may crop up, we
will only look at two polar cases.
First, consider the case where heterogeneity in character is so low that
the ranking of types is still given by the Spence-Mirrlees condition, i.e. more
productive types have ‡atter indi¤erence curves:
µ1º1 < ::: < µ1ºN < µ2º1:::: < µNºN(10)
This case is similar to the case of low heterogeneity in the 2x2 case: more
productive types are always willing to go farther than less productive types,
so there always exists a separating equilibrium. By the intuitive criterion,
there are no pooling or partially pooling equilibria. However, the intuitive
criterion does not allow to rule out ine¢cient separating equilibria that rely
on excess education, because equilibrium dominance arguments have no bite
in this setup. Qualitatively, however, the picture is unchanged.
The other polar case is where heterogeneity in character is so high that
the ranking of types is basically determined by the taste for study, so the
usual Spence-Mirrlees condition fails:
µ1º1 < ::: < µNº1 < µ1º2 < :::: < µNºN(11)
Unlike the case of high heterogeneity in the 2x2 case, the equilibrium will
depend on the distribution of types. To illustrate with a simple example, we
make the further assumption that the distribution of types over competency
types and over tastes for education is uniform. In this context, a partially
pooling equilibrium similar to (9) exists for N = 3:
(12) 0 ? e < e1 ) bµ = µ1
e1 ? e < e2 ) bµ = E(µ)
e2 ? e) bµ = µN
Case N = 3,can be depicted by Figure 4 if point E is now determined
by indi¤erence curve of type (µ2; º3). In that equilibrium, only the two ex-
treme types can be told apart: types (µ1; º1) and (µ3; º3) will be characterized
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by e = 0 and e = e2, respectively. For all the intermediate types, namely
set {(µ2; º1),(µ3; º1),(µ1; º2),(µ2; º2),(µ3; º2),(µ1; º3),(µ2; º3)}, expected com-
petency will be exactly E(µ) with a uniform distribution. Hence, most of
the types will be bunched in the middle. No type will have an incentive
to deviate, so this is a partially pooling equilibrium (there are also similar,
dominated, partially pooling equilibria).
For N > 3, all the above-average productivity types (µ > E(µ)) with the
highest level of taste for study (º = ºN) have an incentive to deviate from an
equilibrium such as (12), going further than types with lower productivity.
Hence, there will be partial revelation of these types. For N odd (for N even,
the argument has to be slightly adjusted), we will have:
(13) 0 ? e < e1 ) bµ = µ1
e1 ? e < e2 ) bµ ' E(µ)
ej ? e < ej+1 ) bµ = µ(N+1)=2+(j¡1); where j = 2; :::; N + 12
This boils down to (12) for N = 3. As an example, for N = 5, types
(µ4; º5) and (µ5; º5) will separate out at the higher end, for N = 7 three
types will separate out, and so on. The equilibrium can be constructed by
analogy to Figure 4. The proportion of types separating out at the high end
goes down steadily: 1/9 for N = 3, 2/25 for N = 5, 3/49 for N = 7, etc.
The proportion of types in the middle rises from 7/9 for N = 3 to 45/49 for
N = 7, so education is less and less informative about work productivity for
a greater proportion of the work force.
We have only given an example with the uniform distribution. My con-
jecture is that with other distribution, one must still get in equilibrium a
distribution of types such that expected productivity is increasing in educa-
tion (otherwise, some types will prefer to deviate to lower levels of education
to get higher wages).
As to cases between the two polar types, for some of the types in between
it will not be possible to tell types apart unequivocally. Viewed in this light
of a multiplicity of types that come closer and closer together, it becomes less
likely that one is ever in the setup with low heterogeneity where education
satis…es the Spence-Mirrlees condition.
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2.6 Relation to other papers
In the economics literature, the di¤erences in character have been analyzed
in various contexts. For example, Levine (1998) considers how heterogeneity
in character (speci…cally, whether an individual is nice to others or not) can
help explain anomalous results in experimental economics. Weinschelbaum
(1998) considers how heterogeneity in both competency and in character
a¤ects the issue of corruption.
In a signaling framework, Streb (2002) considers the consequences of two-
dimensional asymmetric information in the context of the Rogo¤ (1990) equi-
librium budget cycle model, developing more fully an idea introduced in Stein
and Streb (2002). However, the analysis in the Rogo¤ signaling model gets
very involved because the indi¤erence curves of types with di¤erent degrees
of competence may cross more than once if there is high heterogeneity in
character (given there by di¤erences in the degree of opportunism).
The paper that is closest to this, Riley (2001), considers an extension
of the original Spence model when there is “noise”. There are four types
of agents, because some unproductive workers have relatively low signaling
costs in terms of education. This resembles our two-dimensional asymmetric
information framework in which there also are four types of agents, produc-
tive and unproductive, which can have a taste for study or not. From the
viewpoint of …rms in our model, tastes for education just introduce noise into
the signal. In this sense, our model can also be said to be concerned with
the consequences of noise in the Spence model.
However, Riley’s focus is completely di¤erent. He is not concerned about
asymmetric information on other dimensions of a workers characteristics. He
is concerned about what happens to equilibrium re…nements, in particular
the intuitive criterion, when there is noise. Riley shows that in his setup
there is a partially pooling equilibrium with either low education (unproduc-
tive workers with high signaling costs in terms of years of formal education),
or high education (productive workers, or the two types of unproductive
workers with low signaling costs). His main point is that the intuitive crite-
rion no longer selects a single partially pooling equilibrium, since ine¢cient
equilibria can not be ruled out (much like what happens in our setup in
Section 2). He also analyzes other equilibrium re…nements to de…ne out-
of-equilibrium events, emphasizing that the distribution of types is key in
determining the existence of a unique equilibrium (much like what happens
in screening models).
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3 Work experience as a sign
If the issue of heterogeneity in character is empirically relevant, signaling via
education will lead to a partially pooling equilibrium. One would then expect
…rms to use other types of information to sort productive and unproductive
workers. Work experience seems particularly relevant information. Firms get
to know a worker better through day to day contact at work. This generates
private information that allows to assess a worker’s type better. The process
of revelation of productivity at work takes time, so to incorporate this feature
requires a minimum of dynamics.
We extend as follows the setup in the previous section to incorporate this
feature. After the …rst period has elapsed, …rms observe the worker’s true
productivity. This information may or not become public afterwards. We
…rst analyze the case were this information becomes public, and then we look
at the case where this information remains private.
3.1 Public information
Suppose the decision rule that …rms follow is that workers whose wage is equal
to or larger than their productivity are o¤ered a renewal of their contracts.
On the other hand, workers whose contract stipulates a wage larger than
their productivity are …red (the job market may work like this because wage
reductions may be seen as unfair, cf. Akerlof and Yellen 1988). To not enter
into the issue of the duration of unemployment spells, we will simply assume
that workers that are …red have a discontinuous job experience, while workers
that are not …red have a continuous job experience.
In our simple 2x2 setup, the renewal decision rule will provoke a total
revelation of types. Types with low or high education will get their contracts
renewed, since in the …rst-period equilibrium their wages equaled productiv-
ity. As to types with intermediate education, those with low productivity
will be …red, while those with high productivity will get a renewal o¤er. If
these decisions become public information, i.e. workers that are …red become
visibly unemployed, this reveals information to other …rms.
In a competitive environment, the wages of the workers with intermediate
education that get a renewal o¤er will be bid up (note that this argument
does not work in just one round with N > 2: workers with average or above
average productivity get a renewal o¤er, so only the average productivity of
this group of workers is revealed). On the contrary, the wages of the workers
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that are discontinued will be bid down. In this environment, one can hence
expect that high productivity workers will be paid in equilibrium a high wage,
regardless of their level of education, while low productivity workers will be
paid a low wage, regardless of their level of education.
This setup implies there will still be a positive correlation between edu-
cation and wages, and between job experience (or job continuity) and wages.
In the second period, more highly educated workers on average get higher
wages. Workers with no unemployment spell will also tend to get higher
wages.
<please insert Table 2>
As to the …rst period equilibrium, the key issue is that in the second
period wages are independent of education. This implies that the equilibrium
in the …rst period are just as described in Section 2 above, where the costs
of education have to be compared to the bene…ts in that period.
3.2 Private information
Alternatively, one can analyze what happens if …rms reduce wages of em-
ployees who are found to have low productivity. In that case, outside …rms
would not be able to distinguish high and low productivity workers by their
employment record.3
The di¤erence with the previous case of public information is that now the
…rm will have an informational monopoly, and will be under no pressure to
raise the wage of productive workers with intermediate education. If this is so,
then wages in the second period will not be independent of education. This
implies that the …rst and second period games cannot be analyzed separately:
if a workers invests in more education in the …rst period, it might be able to
earn higher wages not only in the …rst but also in the second period.
To analyze the impact on the …rst period equilibrium, one has to incorpo-
rate the fact that education not only leads to higher wages in the …rst period,
but also in the second period for productive workers (for unproductive work-
ers, it only leads to higher wages in the …rst period). This will mean that
indi¤erence curves of productive workers become ‡atter (since their prize is
multiplied by 2, if we ignore any discount factors). Hence, it is more likely
3Other …rms might be able to recognize higher productivity workers despite this if
higher productivity workers are assigned more complicated jobs, or jobs with higher re-
sponsibility, i.e. if some kind of promotion in job hierarchies is visible to outside …rms.
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to be in the low heterogeneity case. More generally, one can say that edu-
cation becomes more revealing. However, a partially pooling equilibrium is
not ruled out even in this case.
3.3 Indices, signals and signs
We have seen that if there is two-dimensional asymmetric information, one
would expect …rms to use other pieces of information to sort workers. The
previous work record is an obvious candidate, since empirically it is a key fac-
tor in determining which job applicants an employer will interview (Behrenz
2001). Formal education is important as a signal, but this information may
be specially relevant to determine entry requirements (again, we are abstract-
ing from the role of education in the buildup of human capital, that enhances
productivity by itself).
As to the informational status of the employment record, Spence (1973)
distinguishes between “indices” and “signals”. Indices are …xed attributes of
job applicants, (mostly) unalterable observable attributes such as race and
sex. Since age does not change at the discretion of the individual, Spence also
considers it an index. Signals are observable characteristics that are subject
to the manipulation by the individual, of which education was singled out
by Spence.
The continuity or discontinuity of work experience, because an individual
may have been …red, is neither a …xed characteristic, nor is it usually subject
to the direct manipulation of the worker. Since it can reveal characteristics
of the worker that are very similar to signals, it might be termed as a “sign”.
Work continuity in the job market is comparable as an informational sign
to credit availability in the credit market. The creditworthiness of small
…rms or individuals may only be privately known to the bank or lender that
has carried out transactions with them and developed a relationship. This
relationship generates private information. However, the very existence of a
relationship, if it is observable, can act as a public sign to third parties of
who is a good credit or not. Being a bank client or getting a credit card can
act as a good sign, and other …nancial intermediaries will try to get these
clients.4 The same happens with people that have continuing employment.
4When I arrived to the US in 1987 to do my Ph.D. at Berkeley, my credit card appli-
cations were turned down by commercial banks because I had no previous credit history.
After Amex gave me a card (in a promotion for university students which said that was
the only guarrantee they needed), I started to receive many o¤ers from commercial banks.
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4 Conclusions
This signaling model implies a variant of Spence (1973). Di¤erences in char-
acter imply that the taste for study (or the desire to achieve social recogni-
tion) vary. In our 2x2 case, this parameter can be either high or low. This
trait is independent from the fact that highly competent individuals have
lower costs of completing formal education.
Signaling can be said to be quite resilient to the introduction of asymmet-
ric information in two dimensions. We analyzed the 2x2 case in detail. With
low heterogeneity in character, the equilibrium is separating. On the other
hand, high heterogeneity in character leads to a partially pooling equilibrium.
Very competent individuals who are highly motivated will stand out from the
rest. At the other extreme will be types with low competency and low moti-
vation. In the middle, the mix of competent individuals who do not have a
taste for education, and of incompetent individuals that do, will be di¢cult
to tell apart. Extreme types still send unequivocal signals. Furthermore,
average competency will be increasing in the degree of education.
This analysis can be extended to consider more types of competency and
of character. When one goes form the 2x2 case to the NxN case, the results
will depend on the distribution of types. In an example with high hetero-
geneity and an uniform distribution, we show that it becomes more likely
that almost all types become bunched in the middle. More generally, as long
as the Spence-Mirrlees condition is violated, there will be some intermediate
types that cannot be perfectly told apart using education as a signal.
If heterogeneity in character is indeed important, education will be an
imperfect proxy for a worker’s productivity, and other information will be
used by …rms. Education –as a signal– will still have an import impact
on entry level wages, in contrast to wages later on in the work cycle. For
additional information, the work record is singled out in this paper. In a
dynamic setting, interaction in the work place gives …rms direct information
on worker productivity. Though on-the-job experience generates private in-
formation to the employer, the continuity of working relationships can also
act as a sign of high productivity to other …rms. If this becomes public in-
formation because, e.g., higher productivity workers are more likely to keep
their job, this would be consistent with the …nding that wages are increasing
with on-the-job experience in empirical wage equations.
The present framework shows how to incorporate other dimensions of
a person’s personality into the analysis. It might be applied to consider
15
the closely related issue of the in‡uence of emotional intelligence on work
productivity. Formal education may capture basically what has to do with
formal intelligence, but labor productivity depends on other traits that are
not (even imperfectly) evaluated by the educational system. This will be the
subject of subsequent work.
The present framework completely ignores that work productivity in part
is a matter of matching the right person to the right job, which of course
greatly complicates the process of getting an e¢cient outcome.
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Table 1
Low (θ1) High (θ2)
Low (ν1) p11 p12
Taste ν
High (ν2) p21 p22
 - probability distribution -
Types of individuals
Competency θ
Table 2
Education:
None θ 1
Positive p21θ 1+(p12+p22)θ2
p21+p12+p22
Job experience:
Discontinuous θ 1
Continuous p11θ1+(p12+p22)θ2
p11+p12+p22
 - conditional on signal -
Wage in second period
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Figure 1
Separating equilibrium: low heterogeneity
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Figure 2
Pooling equilibrium
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Figure 3
Separating equilibrium: high heterogeneity
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Figure 4
Partially pooling equilibrium
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